Privacy oriented access control for electronic health records by Gajanayake, Randike et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Gajanayake, Randike, Iannella, Renato, & Sahama, Tony R. (2012) Pri-
vacy oriented access control for electronic health records. In Data Usage
Management on the Web Workshop at the Worldwide Web Conference,
ACM, Lyon Convention Centre, Lyon, France.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/48992/
c© Copyright 2012 ACM
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Privacy Oriented Access Control for Electronic Health 
Records 
Randike Gajanayake 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane, Australia 
g.gajanayake@qut.edu.au
Renato Iannella 
NEHTA 
Brisbane, Australia 
renato.iannella@nehta.gov.au 
Tony Sahama 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane, Australia 
t.sahama@qut.edu.au 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Security and privacy in electronic health record systems have 
been hindering the growth of e-health systems since their 
emergence. The development of policies that satisfy the security 
and privacy requirements of different stakeholders in healthcare 
has proven to be difficult. But, these requirements have to be 
met if the systems developed are to succeed in achieving their 
intended goals. Access control is a fundamental security barrier 
for securing data in healthcare information systems.  In this 
paper we present an access control model for electronic health 
records. We address patient privacy requirements, 
confidentiality of private information and the need for flexible 
access for health professionals for electronic health records. We 
carefully combine three existing access control models and 
present a novel access control model for EHRs which satisfies 
requirements of electronic health records.    
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information 
Systems]: Security and Protection - access control  
General Terms 
Algorithms, Security 
Keywords 
Access control, MAC, DAC, RBAC, privacy, security, 
electronic health records, EHR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Security of electronic health records (eHR) is a critical aspect of 
e-health solutions. Many different solutions have been 
developed over the years but the questions still remains as to 
whether the data in eHRs are secure enough. The National e-
health transition authority (NEHTA) is the Australian authority 
dedicated to developing better ways of electronically collecting 
and securely exchanging health information. In their newest 
venture, the development of the personally controlled electronic 
health record (PCEHR) system, they have identified that privacy 
and security are major issues that need to be addressed properly 
in order for the proposed model to be well received [1]. 
Authentication is the initial stage of validation of the users to 
determine whether they are who they claim they are. Once 
authenticated, the users can enter an information system but 
access to information will still be governed by an access control 
policy. Access control is one of the main safeguards against 
improper data access. Access control aims to control the data 
usage of authorised users [2]. Access control models assume 
that the users are authorised to access the information system. 
After authorisation, the access control mechanism will define 
what information each authorised user can access. Many 
different access control models have been proposed and among 
them discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access 
control (MAC) and role based access control (RBAC) are well 
established models. 
Proper access control policies are a necessity for any EHR 
systems operation [1, 3]. Healthcare is an information dependant 
industry. The nature of the healthcare industry makes the access 
requirements different from other types of industries. Healthcare 
providers have data access requirements and the patients have 
data privacy requirements which may, in some instances, 
contradict the access requirements of the healthcare provider. 
Fulfilling all requirements is a complex task that has to be 
overcome in order to gain the confidence and trust of the end 
users of healthcare information systems. 
In this paper we will introduce a privacy oriented access control 
model for electronic health records. The model is designed by 
combining the afore mentioned access control models with a 
purpose based access control (PBAC) mechanism for data 
access by authorised users. The purpose of the introduced access 
control model is to capture the different requirements of e-health 
into one module that can be adopted in a working electronic 
health records system. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In this section we will briefly introduce the access control 
models that have been considered in this paper. Even though 
these models have gone through many alterations and 
extensions, we will consider the basic principles behind each 
model so that is it easy to clarify how each model has been 
applied in our proposed access control model. Different access 
control strategies for e-health systems have also been developed 
in the past [3, 4]. Even though this work has been considered in 
developing the proposed model, due to space restrictions we will 
not discuss those techniques and approaches in this paper. 
2.1 Discretionary access control 
Discretionary Access Control uses access restriction set by the 
owner of the data object to restrict access to the objects. The 
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users are bound by the authorizations which specify the 
operations each user can perform on specified objects such as 
read (R), write (W) and execute (EXE) [2]. The DAC model 
uses an access control matrix to assign access rights to users. A 
simple access control matrix is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Access control matrix 
User Object 1 Object 2 Object 3 Object 4 
Peter R,W, EXE R,W - R,W, EXE 
Claudia R,W - R,W, EXE - 
Bill - R,W, EXE R, W - 
Matt - - - R,W, EXE 
Implementing this matrix in large systems is a tedious task and 
representing it as a matrix will consume a considerable amount 
of resources. To represent this in a practical system the most 
common approach is by means of an Access Control List (ACL) 
and a Capability List (CL). An ACL is used to associate each 
object with the users who can access it. This association also 
contains the type of access (R, W, and EXE) to the object. This 
is a column wise representation of the access matrix. A 
Capability List is used to associate each user with the access 
permissions to the objects. This is a row wise representation of 
the access matrix. 
DAC models have some inherent drawbacks. A significant issue 
is the fact that a user who is allowed to access an object by the 
owner of the object has the capability to pass on the access right 
to other users without the involvement of the owner of the 
object. This will create inevitable privacy issues if the DAC 
policy is used in an eHR system. Another factor we have to 
consider is the ownership of the data. In healthcare we cannot 
clearly identify a single entity as the owner of health data. An 
initial argument would be that the patients are the owners of 
their own health data. But patients are not always health 
professionals and it is likely that the involvement of a health 
authority of a relevant sort is necessary. Due to these reasons it 
is difficult to use only a DAC policy and fulfill access and 
privacy requirements of all healthcare stakeholders. 
2.2 Mandatory access control 
Mandatory access control systems do not consider the 
requirements of the owners of the data objects [5]. The access to 
data objects is controlled by assigning a security level to each 
object and comparing that security level to the user’s security 
clearance and need-to-know. In order to access an object, the 
user must possess a clearance that is greater than or equal to the 
objects classification. In the MAC policy the flow of 
information from a higher security level to a lower security level 
is prevented by the “Read Down” and “Write Up” rules [2]. 
Similarly the integrity of the data objects can be protected by 
using the “Read Up” and “Write Down” Rules. 
In a healthcare environment, we believe that assigning security 
levels to objects for the purpose of restricting access is not 
suitable. This is because the same type of data may have 
different sensitivity levels for different patients. We will discuss 
how we overcome this later in the paper. 
2.3 Role based access control 
Role base access control [6] models use permissions and rights 
that are assigned to roles in an organization to control access to 
data objects. It does not consider the access rights of an 
individual. Roles are assigned to all individual users in the 
systems. The users inherit the access permissions assigned to 
each role. This allows the system administrators to assign users 
to roles rather than go through the tedious task of assigning 
access rights to each and every user. 
Roles are assigned to users depending on their capabilities and 
the job requirements within an organization. Each user must be 
given the least privilege depending on their job functions. 
RBAC policy uses the need-to-know principle to assign 
permissions to roles and to fulfill the least privilege condition. 
2.4 Purpose based access control 
According to the OECD guidelines, “the purposes for which 
personal data are collected should be specified not later than at 
the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the 
fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each 
occasion of change of purpose” [7]. Purpose-based access 
control (PBAC) is bases on the notion of relating data objects 
with purposes [8]. These purposes can determine for what 
reason data is collected and what they can be used for. Much 
research has been done in this area and most have identified that 
greater privacy preservation is possible by assigning objects 
with purposes [8-10]. However, according to Al-Fedaghi [11], 
purpose management introduces a great deal of complexity at 
the access control level. Despite the complexity issues with 
PBAC, it can help capture the reasons for data collection as well 
as the intentions of the users, which is a vital factor in healthcare 
information systems where privacy preservation is a must. 
3. ACCESS AND PRIVACY 
REQUIREMENTS OF EHE END USERS 
Environments such as healthcare require security 
mechanisms that are different and more specialized than those 
applicable to other industries. Access control models that have 
been developed are insufficient to fulfill the requirements of 
eHR systems [12]. This is due to the convoluted nature of the 
industry and the nature of the information used. To address this 
issue a specialized access control model has to be designed 
taking in to consideration the different requirements of different 
users/entities involved. 
In healthcare there are certain requirements that cannot be 
disregarded when developing an information system. In this 
section we will discuss those requirements with respect to 
healthcare providers and patients that have to be considered and 
addressed in terms of access control. 
3.1 Access Requirements of Healthcare 
Providers 
The following access requirements of healthcare providers (both 
individual and the health authority) can be identified that need 
to be addressed in the development of an information system. 
1. A healthcare authority should have the capability to 
define their security policies within an organization. 
2. Healthcare providers need easy access to the relevant 
information in a non restrictive and timely manner. 
3. Healthcare providers need to have the capability to 
share patient health information with other health 
specialists to make well informed decisions. 
4. A healthcare authority should have the power to 
override the patients’ security settings in certain 
circumstances. E.g. A life threatening emergency 
situation. 
3.2 Privacy Requirements of a Patient 
A patient’s health information may contain sensitive information 
such as sexual health, mental health, addictions to drug or 
alcohol, abortions, etc. This makes such a patient demand strong 
security for their eHRs. These requirements however cannot 
contradict those set by the healthcare providers or the healthcare 
authority discussed above. If they do so the settings set by the 
health authority must prevail. A formal definition of this is given 
later in the paper. We note however, that in the PCEHR [1] 
system proposed by NEHTA, all privacy settings are set by the 
patients. Therefore such conflicts will not arise in their proposed 
system. The following capabilities can be identified as 
requirements of a patient with an eHR in terms of access control.  
1. Patients need to have the capability to control access to 
their eHR. They should be able to allow only a 
preferred set of medical practitioners to access their 
eHR. 
2. Patients need to be able to hide certain health 
information from health practitioners who already have 
access to their eHR. 
3. Should have the capability to see how their eHR is 
manipulated by users who have access to it. 
4. The administration process of the security settings must 
be easy to understand and handle. 
It is important to note that access restrictions might not always 
be beneficial to the patient. While fulfilling these privacy 
requirements under no circumstance must the patients’ health be 
compromised. 
4. PROPOSED ACCESS CONTROL 
MODEL 
The proposed model consists of four modules, a RBAC module, 
a MAC module, a DAC module and a PBAC module to fulfill 
the requirements of each of the stakeholders. The basic protocol 
for the proposed access control system is illustrated in Figure 1. 
We assume that the patient has a comprehensive eHR which is 
managed by a relevant health authority. In reality individuals 
may not want all information entered in to their eHR [1]. This 
requirement of course can easily be considered at the point of 
data entry. Nonetheless, we will show how a proper access 
control mechanism would eliminate the need to withhold 
information. In the proposed model the patient, the preferred 
healthcare providers and the health authority has certain 
operations and responsibilities to perform and fulfill. 
Table 2. Data types and purposes 
Data type Intended Purpose(s) 
Identity Data (PII) p1 
General Health p1, p2, p3, p4 
Sexual Health p5 
Mental Health p5, p6, p7 
The eHR is divided into data types (Table 2). Each data type in 
the eHR has to have a purpose or a set of related purposes. 
These are the intended purposes for which data is collected. 
 
Figure 1. Proposed access control architecture 
Definition of purposes, without doubt, is a complicated task that 
requires much care. This process itself has to explore medical 
knowledge from medical professionals who can identify the 
significance of a single data element in the care giving process. 
Purpose definition itself has to be a system design phase since 
these purposes will govern the final access to data in the 
proposed access control model. The data types contain data 
elements related to them.  In a more fine grained level purposes 
are related to data elements. For example, Identity Data of a 
patient can be divided into Name, Date of Birth, Age, 
Residential Address, etc. The Address can be further divided 
into street address, Town, State, Country and post code. The 
more detached the data field gets, the more fine grained it 
become. We will not go into details of how each data element is 
related to purposes in this paper. We shall leave that under 
future work and will simply assume that sufficient relationships 
exist between data elements and purposes. 
The health authority will manage the relationship between data 
types and purposes. There will be a default set of purposes for 
every data type and elements of that data type. The health 
authority can define, add and remove purposes related to data 
types and elements. This will ensure that up to date purposes are 
maintained in the systems such that the access requirements of 
care providers are not wrongfully denied. It is understood that 
the proper definition of intended purposes is a key factor in this 
model. For the system to reach an optimum performance level it 
will undoubtedly take time in which initial purpose definitions 
would be altered and new purposes defined. The data elements 
in the eHR are also assigned a sensitivity label. This label will 
be used to determine who has clearance to access the data 
element. The overall description of the proposed protocol is 
given in the sections below using a case scenario. 
4.1 Case scenario 
Gary has a comprehensive eHR which is managed by a central 
healthcare authority. 
 
Figure 2. Case scenario 
Gary’s GP is Peter. As his GP, Gary has allowed Peter complete 
access to the data in his eHR. Gary has also been treated by 
Sandra a dermatologist, Bill a sexual health specialist and Matt a 
mental health specialist in the recent past. As a result Gary 
allows Bill to access his sexual health details, Matt to access his 
mental health details and Sandra to access his dermatology 
health details. He does not want Bill or Sandra accessing his 
mental health details and Matt or Sandra accessing his sexual 
health details. He also does not want either Bill or Matt 
accessing his dermatology details since he suffers from a severe 
case of skin disease that he’s embarrassed of. He is aware that 
his care providers may need to share his information with other 
specialists but does not want them sharing the details without 
his consent. Sandra believes Gary’s skin condition may be 
related to a known STD and wants access to Gary’s sexual 
health details. 
4.2 Role Based Access Control Module 
In the RBAC module the healthcare authority will define the 
role structure of the health organization and assign the minimum 
access level for each role in the organization. In this role 
definition each role will be given a default sensitivity level for 
data access which will be discussed later. Even though the 
patients’ privacy requirements have to be considered before data 
access is granted, there is no input from the patient for this 
module. The module is purely dedicated to fulfilling the 
organizational access and policy requirements. 
4.3 Mandatory Access Control Module 
In the MAC module, the health authority defines intended 
purposes for each data type and element. Deciding the 
sensitivity level of health information is a complex issue. The 
sensitivity labeling mentioned here are different from the 
classical hierarchical security levels found in MAC [2]. It is 
difficult to define a clear hierarchical structure for the sensitivity 
of data elements that is general to all participants. For example, 
sexual health and mental health information may have the same 
sensitivity label for some patients and may not be so for others. 
If a hierarchical structure is defined, it would be difficult to 
fulfill certain privacy requirements of patients. 
 
Figure 3. Object sensitivity tree 
We propose sensitivity labeling of eHR data using a tree 
structure (Figure 3) that has the eHR itself as the root element, 
the data types as children and data elements as grandchildren. 
We use a similar technique introduced for purpose 
representation in Byun et al [13] to represent the sensitivity 
label of data elements in our model. We refer to this 
representation as the Sensitivity Tree (ST). A sensitivity label is 
not assigned to the objects themselves rather we relate the access 
level of a particular user in terms of the sensitivity label of the 
data elements. 
Definition:  A sensitivity label (SL) is a tuple <ASL, PSL>, 
where ASL = {asl1, asl2…asln} a set of allowed sensitivity labels 
and PSL = {psl1, psl2…psln} is a set of prohibited sensitivity 
labels. 
ASL = {asli}; i = 1…n is denoted as all of the descendants of asli 
including asli. 
PSL = {pslj}; j = 1…n is denoted as all of the descendants of pslj 
including pslj. 
Example: Matt can access to Gary’s mental health details but 
cannot access his Sexual or Dermatology details. The access 
level for Matt can be represented in terms of sensitivity labels as 
follows. 
SLMatt = < {eHR}, {Sexual Health, Dermatology Health} > 
Here we use the Denial-Takes-Precedence [14] principle. Access 
is granted to the entire eHR and then access is denied to specific 
field by the PSL. This helps isolate the most sensitive 
information in the eHR that need to be hidden from certain 
users. The access level for a particular user can also be 
represented as follows. 
SLMatt = < {Identity Data, General Health, Mental Health}, 
{NULL} > 
But this will be a tedious than specifying the data elements that 
Matt cannot access. We will use this representation to represent 
the minimum access levels defined by the health authority. The 
health authority is only concerned with allowing access to 
particular data fields for the relevant health practitioners. This 
representation can also be used in purposes such as research 
where access is required only to a particular data type. 
Example: Data for a survey of people who have suffered from an 
STD in the last 10 years. For this purpose access is required 
only for the sexual health data type. Under no foreseeable 
circumstance would there be a requirement for accessing other 
fields of the eHR. The access level can be represented as 
follows. 
SLResearcher = < {Sexual Health}, {NULL}> 
4.4 Discretionary Access Control Module 
In the DAC module the patient will specify who can access his 
eHR. He will populate an Access Control List (ACL) with the 
healthcare practitioners who he prefers to be able to access his 
eHR. The patient also has the capability to specify the access 
level of each of the users in terms of a sensitivity label in the 
ACL which is done using the MAC module as seen earlier. 
Table 3. Access control list 
Healthcare 
Practitioner Patient’s Settings 
Minimum Access 
Level Set by Health 
Authority 
Peter <{eHR}, {NULL}> <{General Health},{NULL}> 
Sandra 
<{eHR},{Sexual 
Health, Mental 
Health}> 
<{Dermatology, 
Sexual 
Health},{NULL}> 
Bill 
<{eHR},{Mental 
Health, 
Dermatology}> 
<{General Health, 
Sexual 
Health},{NULL}> 
Matt 
<{eHR},{Sexual 
Health, 
Dermatology 
Health}> 
<{General Health, 
Mental 
Health},{NULL}> 
The table above shows an abstract ACL. Gary has granted 4 
health care practitioners access to his eHR. But the access is 
bound by the patient’s privacy settings and the settings by the 
health authority. The settings by the health authority are set 
during the role assignment in the RBAC module. 
The sensitivity level defined by the health authority is different 
to the ones defines by the patients. PSLs set by the health 
authority will always be NULL. As mentioned above, this is 
because the health authority is concerned with allowing access 
to the health professionals. The prohibitions are defined by the 
patients. The allowed sensitivity level set by the patients always 
precedes that which is set by the health authority if there is no 
conflict between the patients prohibited sensitivity label and the 
allowed sensitivity label set by the health authority. The allowed 
sensitivity level set by the health authority always precedes the 
prohibited sensitivity label set by the patients if there is a 
conflict. This characteristic/notion will ensure that the relevant 
information is always available to the right person in terms of 
providing better healthcare. A formal definition for this notion is 
given below. 
Definition:  
• IF (ASLPatient ≥ ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ 
ASLHealthAuthority = ∅) THEN SLHealthProfessional = < 
{ASLPatient, {PSLPatient} > 
• IF (ASLPatient ≤ ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ 
ASLHealthAuthority = ∅) THEN SLHealthProfessional = < 
{ASLHealthAuthority}, {PSLPatient} > 
• IF (ASLPatient ≥ ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ 
ASLHealthAuthority ≠ ∅) THEN SLHealthProfessional = < 
{ASLPatient}, {PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority`} > 
When these conditions are satisfied, the sensitivity levels are 
updated so that the users can access the relevant data 
types/elements. E.g. Sandra (Table 4) will be assigned a 
sensitivity level SLSandra = < {eHR}, {Mental Health}>. 
The algorithm for setting the sensitivity levels for the users is 
shown in Figure 3. The symbols other than the ones used 
previously denote as follows. PSL and HASL denote sensitivity 
levels set by the Patient (P) and the Health Authority (HA) 
respectively. 
Algorithm: 1: Set Sensitivity Label SLUID 
Input: 1. User ID: UID 
2. Access Control List: ACL 
Output: User Sensitivity Label SLUID 
Method: 
{:: Get PSL_UID and HASL_UID from ACL ::} 
PSL_UID ← <ASLP_UID, PSLP_UID> 
HASL_UID ← <ASLHA_UID, PSLHA_UID> 
{:: Determine User Sensitivity Label ::} 
if (ASLP_UID ≥ ASLHA_UID AND PSLP_UID ∩ 
ASLHA_UID = ∅) then 
SLUID ← < {ASLP_UID}, {PSLP_UID} > 
else if (ASLP_UID ≤ ASLHA_UID AND 
PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID = ∅) then 
SLUID ← < {ASLHA_UID}, 
{PSLP_UID} > 
else if (ASLP_UID ≥ ASLHA_UID AND 
PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID ≠ ∅) then 
SLUID ← < {ASLP_UID}, 
{PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID `} > 
else if (ASLP_UID ≤ ASLHA_UID AND 
PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID ≠ ∅) then 
SLUID ← < {ASLHA_UID}, 
{PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID `} > 
end if 
return SLUID 
Figure 3. Algorithm 1 
 
4.5 Purpose Based Access Control Module 
This module primarily deals with the access requests of 
authorised users. When a user wants to access data in the eHR 
they define an access request consisting of the reason for data 
access. This definition will be compared to the purposes in 
Table 2 which were assigned to the data elements by the health 
authority and if satisfied access will be granted. 
Table 4. Access requests by authorised users 
User Sensitivity level Data Type (d) Access Purpose (p) 
Peter <{eHR},{NULL}> 
Identity Data p1,p2 
General Health p3 
Mental Health p7, p4 
Sexual Health p5 
Sandra 
<{eHR},{Mental 
Health}> 
Dermatology p8 
Sexual Health p5 
The above table represents typical access requests by authorised 
health practitioners. An access request may not particularly be 
for a single task. And each data type requested may not always 
be associated with a single purpose. The users must have the 
capability to specify multiple purposes in a single access request 
to enhance the ease of use. If access is granted we have to make 
the assumption that each data element can only be used for the 
specified access purpose(s). The health information systems 
which would use this access control model should have the 
capability to provide the functionality where data misuse can be 
captured.  
The algorithm for processing an access request by a health 
professional is given in Figure 4. A tuple with data type and 
purpose is denoted as <d, p>. Permit_Data [] contains the 
status (allowed or disallowed) of the data types requested by the 
user. Check_Purpose [Num_Requests, Num_Pur] is a 2D array 
containing the status of the purposes for each the data type 
requested. The algorithm returns and array Access_State [] with 
the state of each purpose in the access request. IntPurList [dIP, 
pIP] is a 2D array with data types with their intended purposes 
(set by the health authority). AccPurList [dIP, pIP] is a 2D array 
with the data types and their access purposes (requested by a 
user). 
Algorithm: 2: Access Request 
Input: 1. User ID: UID 
                2. Sensitivity Level: SLUID 
3. Access Purposes List: AccPurList[dAP, pAP] 
4. Access Control List: ACL 
5. Intended Purposes List: IntPurList [dIP, pIP] 
Output: Access_State [] 
Method: 
Num_Requests ← Size (AccPurList) 
Access_State [Num_Requests] ← False 
Permit_Data [Num_Requests] ← False 
Check_Purpose [Num_Requests, Num_Pur] ← False 
for i = 1 to Num_Requests do 
if IntPurList(i) ∈ PSL(SLUID ) then 
Permit_Data[i] ← False 
else 
Permit_Data[i] ← True 
 end if 
{::Determine whether intended purposes of a data type is in 
IntPurList for the same data type::} 
for j = 1 to Size(AccPurList(i)) do 
if AccPurList[i, j] ⊆ IntPurList then 
Check_Purpose [i, j] ← True 
else 
Check_Purpose [i, j] ← False 
 
if {(Permit_Data [i] = True) AND 
(Check_Purpose [i, j] = True ) = True} 
then 
Access_State [i] ← True 
else 
Access_State [i] ← False 
end if 
end for 
end for 
return Access_State [] 
Figure 4. Algorithm 2 
It is important to note that the nature of the healthcare industry 
force us to adopt the break the glass emergency mechanisms 
where the patients health prevails over privacy requirements. 
Also, usability is a vital part of every healthcare information 
system. No matter what the underlying principles are, the users, 
both patients and the healthcare providers must be given simple 
directions (e.g. menu) where they can set their access settings 
easily. 
4.6 Information Sharing Example 
In our case scenario let us assume that Peter, using the PBAC 
module defined within the portal for authorised users, initiates a 
request to share Gary’s sexual health details with another health 
professional Claudia for the benefit of Gary. Here however, 
Claudia should have the relevant access clearance by the health 
authority to access the type of data specified by the requester. 
This default access level is set using the RBAC and MAC 
modules of the access control model. It is not necessarily 
required that the receiving health professional be in Gary’s ACL 
which is defined by Gary through the DAC and MAC modules 
since it is a request by an authenticated user. It is important to 
note that Gary’s consent for sharing information is already given 
to Peter by the policies set by the patient and the health 
authority. Gary can give any health professional the right to 
share his health information without his consent with other 
health professionals. If Claudia accepts the request she becomes 
an authorised user of the system with the relevant access level. 
Gary has the right to remove Claudia from the ACL at a later 
time. Gary is notified of the actions of the users at relevant times 
to make the system transparent. It is important to note that 
information is shared for the benefit of the patient. Information 
must not be misused by the users. Trust plays a major role in the 
information sharing process.  Furthermore, such processes are 
traceable and accountable. An eHR system using this protocol 
must have the capability to prevent users from misusing 
information. 
5. PROTOTYPE 
A prototype of the proposed access control model was 
developed. The prototype is a Web based system aimed at 
testing the proposed protocol. A Web based prototype was 
developed because with extensions, information accountability 
systems with reasoning capabilities such as the one proposed by 
Gajanayake et. al [15] can be developed. 
  
Figure 5. Left: patients can allow or deny access to data types for health professionals Right: patients can view current health 
professionals who has access to particular data elements and can assign new health professionals to access the data elements 
This implementation is focused only on demonstrating the 
proposed access control protocol. We are not focused on actual 
system usability at this stage. Figure 5 shows a portion of the 
prototype that allows patients to set and manage their privacy 
policies. 
The prototype is developed to handle three types of users; 
patients, health authority and health professionals. The patients 
and the health authority can set privacy and access policies and 
the final policies are formulated according to the protocol 
discussed above. A simple SQL database is used to hold the 
policies and the data in the eHR. Health professionals can lodge 
access requests which consist of access purposes and will be 
processed according to the protocol using an intended purposes 
database managed by the health authority. The management of 
intended purposes is not facilitated in this prototype. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have introduced a novel access control model 
for electronic health record systems using prominent access 
control models. We have identified certain requirements of end 
users of an electronic health record system and our proposed 
model is designed to fulfill those requirements. Further to what 
has been discussed in this paper we propose the following 
additions. Purpose definition is an important part in our model. 
Building a comprehensive set of purposes and maintaining them 
is vital. These definitions must capture medical knowledge as 
well as system requirements. The health details of family 
members and relative are an important resource that must be 
available to the caring professional. We intend to extend the 
proposed model such that those links can also be incorporated in 
to the model while still maintaining the integrity of the privacy 
capability of the model. We are also working to extend the 
proposed model to support explicit actions as described in [16] 
and providing non-restrictive access to health information for 
the authorized persons while incorporating an information 
accountability framework [15] so that health information would 
not be misused. Proper representation of policies is vital for 
such systems. We are working on extending the proposed model 
such that the policies are represented in a suitable rights 
expression language namely the open digital rights language 
(ODRL) [17]. In this extended work we introduce an 
information accountability framework with policy reasoning 
capabilities which fulfils information accountability principles. 
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